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The main purpose of this article is to show that enactivism and ecological psychology
share more aspects than is often recognized. Rather than debating about differences,
commonalities between the approaches are illustrated with the example of dynamic
touch. Dynamic touch is a form of touch that implies muscles and tendons and that
allows the perception of hand-held objects that are wielded but not seen. Given that
perceivers perform the wielding movements with effort, dynamic touch necessarily
implies active exploration. The strength of dynamic touch as an example lies in the
fact that it has been formalized and analyzed in detail at the level of the laws that
govern the organism-environment system. The example provides empirically supported
instantiations of sensorimotor contingencies, in enactivist terms, and of intentional
exploration and information detection, in ecological terms. Moreover, dynamic touch is
a practical example of the enactivist concepts of bringing-forth the world and sense-
making. As a second purpose, we use the example of dynamic touch to clarify
key concepts of the ecological approach. Specifically, we analyze the concepts of
invariance and affordance, indicating the crucial difference between perceiving and
actualizing affordances, and highlighting the importance of these concepts for the
dialogue between enactivism and ecological psychology.
Keywords: ecological psychology, dynamic touch, enactivism, intentionality, postcognitivism
ENACTIVISM AND ECOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY SHOULD
BRIDGE THE UNCANNY VALLEY
The enactive and ecological approaches are two disciplines concerned with understanding cognitive
systems using a perspective that avoids scientific constructs such as internal representations or
mental states, focusing instead on the interaction between the agent and its environment. Despite
these strong commonalities, confrontation between enactive and ecological approaches has been
the norm since the early days of enactivism. In the introduction of their book, Sensorimotor Life,
Di Paolo et al. (2017) consider the relation between the enactive approach to cognition and the
ecological approach to perception and action. In their words:
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The relation between the schools of thought is one of strange
familiarity, as if their respective practitioners were staring at each
other across an uncanny valley. It is true that both approaches
overlap in their rejection of representationalism, but this does not
mean they are necessarily rejecting the same thing. As we will
discuss further in this chapter and demonstrate in the following
ones, the enactive perspective rejects a functionalist general
approach to cognition, whereas ecological psychology rejects
the assumption of the poverty of environmental information.
These are not the same thing. For Gibsonians, perception is
still about information pickup, but not for enactivists, who
conceive of perception as an aspect of sense-making, a concept
that is explicitly grounded in the notion of autonomous agency.
(Footnote 3, p. 18)
In this article, we unfold the concepts that, according to
Di Paolo et al. (2017), divide the traditions. We consider what
information pick-up is for ecological psychology and whether it
is compatible with the ideas of sense-making and autonomous
agency from the enactivist approach.
As discussed in our previous work (Higueras-Herbada et al.,
2019), the so-called 4E approaches (Gonzalez-Grandon and
Froese, 2018; cf. Calvo and Gomila, 2008) – which include
enactivism – only turn an eye to the much older ecological
approach occasionally. As do the 4E approaches, the ecological
approach has criticized the cognitivist approach from its very
beginning (see Fultot et al., 2016, and the commentaries on
that article; see also Lobo et al., 2018, for a historical overview
of the ecological approach). The different origins and foci
of enactivism and ecological psychology, however, have at
times prevented that the commonalities between the approaches
are appropriately reflected in the writings of scholars of the
respective approaches (cf. Baggs, 2018). As Di Paolo et al.
(2017) state:
This is one of the reasons for the admittedly rather quick
dismissal of ecological psychology by Varela et al. (1991), who
saw it only capable of providing a theory of cognition on the
side of the environment. In later years, there have been many
attempts at bringing the two traditions closer to each other.
(Footnote 3, p. 18)
As indicated in the previous quote, recently there have
been a number of attempts to relate enactivism and ecological
psychology, giving room to at least three main positions
(Higueras-Herbada et al., 2019). The first position considers
the approaches irreconcilable (Cariani, 2016) or with substantial
differences (Mossio and Taraborelli, 2008). The second position
considers the approaches complementary, focusing on different
levels of analysis. Thus, whereas the ecological theory of
perception focuses on the ecological level of analysis, enactivism
focuses on autonomous agency or on a subpersonal level
of analysis (Heras-Escribano, 2016, 2019a,b; McGann, 2016).
A third position, as formulated by Stapleton (2016) in
her commentary on Fultot et al. (2016), holds that there
are already examples that joint crucial concepts of the
considered approaches:
It seems to me that much of the research developed in the
ecological psychology approach, and the conceptual tools used,
are valuably incorporated by enactivists to flesh out a full
framework of life and mind. Likewise, ecological psychology can
benefit from the depth of the enactivist enterprise. (p. 327)
We believe that theoretical papers concerning the enactive and
ecological approaches should be understood as being engaged
in dialogical discussions (Voloshinov and Bachtin, 1986). In
such discussions, main concepts are treated as dialogemes, which
is to say, as voices where the content of the terms has to be
colonized by a tradition. In such a process, differences between
approaches are often stressed, even subtle ones, concealing
strong commonalities. In order to avoid such detrimental drift,
the present article takes the opposite direction and aims to
stress commonalities.
Just above the quote that opened this article, Di Paolo et al.
(2017) state:
As proof of how close the approaches can be in concrete
cases, we make use throughout this book of work originating
in the Gibsonian tradition (Gibson, 1979/1986). This tradition
usually supplies some of the clearest examples of how dynamical
engagements and bodily synergies can be explanatorily powerful.
(Footnote 3, p.18)
In this article, we focus on what we consider the best
example to indicate points of coincidence of the approaches,
and to describe classic ecological concepts such as affordance,
invariant, and information pick-up through intentional (goal-
driven) exploration. This example is the one of dynamic touch.
WHAT IS DYNAMIC TOUCH?
As far as we are aware, the study of dynamic touch can be traced
back to Gibson’s article Observations on Active Touch (Gibson,
1962) and his seminal book The Senses Considered as Perceptual
Systems (Gibson, 1966). In the article, Gibson questioned the
everyday relevance of touch as conceived as a passive sensory
channel. Instead, he highlighted the active nature of touch and
the prominent role of exploration. He did so by comparing
passive and active conditions of haptic perception in a series of
experiments. In his words:
Active touch refers to what is ordinarily called touching. This
ought to be distinguished from passive touch, or being touched.
In one case the impression on the skin is brought about by the
perceiver himself and in the other case by some outside agency
. . . . Active touch is an exploratory rather than a merely receptive
sense. When a person touches something with his fingers he
produces the stimulation as it were. More exactly, variations in
skin stimulation are caused by variation in his motor activity. . . .
Such movements are not the ordinary kind usually thought of
as responses. They do not modify the environment but only the
stimuli coming from the environment. (Gibson, 1962, p. 477)
Gibson referred for the first time to dynamic touch (dynamic
touching in the original) in the two chapters about haptics
in his 1966 book (Gibson, 1966). In these chapters, Gibson
recognized that part of the kinesthetic system allows a muscle-
based perception of properties of external objects (Gibson, 1966,
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p.109). This is why dynamic touch, on occasions, is referred to as
muscle-based perception.
In a practical sense, dynamic touch concerns the everyday
haptic perception of natural and manufactured objects that
we hold in our hands. Just to name a few examples, this
includes the perception of how far we can throw objects through
hefting (Bingham et al., 1989; Zhu and Bingham, 2008, 2010),
if objects can be used for hammering (Wagman and Carello,
2001), the perception of shape (Burton et al., 1990), tool use
(Michaels et al., 2007), the perception of heaviness (Shockley
et al., 2001), and even an explanation of the size-weight illusion
(Amazeen and Turvey, 1996).
Manipulating objects, such as a tennis racket, produces
perceptions that cannot be explained appealing exclusively to the
stimulation of the skin. In Gibson’s (1966) words:
The passive skin can be stimulated by an object resting on it, the
amount of pressure (that is, skin deformation) being proportional
to the weight of the object, but in this case discrimination is rather
poor. It is much better when the object is lifted. (p. 127)
The different amounts of stretching and contracting of
muscles, as well as the forces exerted by and on the muscles and
on the tendons, change depending on the movements that are
performed and on the form, size, and mass distribution of the
object. Those variations form the main sensory basis of dynamic
touch (Carello and Turvey, 2015, 2017).
The pivotal elements of the ecological conception of dynamic
touch are the laws that connect motor components (forces
exerted by muscles) and sensory components (in muscles and
tendons). In this regard, the ecological portrayal of dynamic
touch shows remarkable similarities with key concepts of the
enactive tradition. Consider the example of the softness of
a sponge that figures importantly in the writings of enactive
scholars. According to O’Regan et al. (2005):
Having the sensation of softness consists in being aware that one
can exercise certain practical skills with respect to the sponge: one
can, for example, press it, and it will yield under the pressure. The
experience of softness of the sponge is characterized by a variety of
such possible patterns of interaction with the sponge, and the laws
that describe these sensorimotor interactions we call, following
MacKay (1962), laws of sensorimotor contingency (O’Regan and
Noë, 2001). (p. 56)
In this regard it is curious to note that, when Gibson developed
his intuitions about the functioning of dynamic touch, he cited
several studies on the perception of softness, much in line with
the writings of enactivist scholars. In Gibson’s (1966) words:
The firmness or softness of a material substance is a property
of the substance that is registered when forces are exerted on it
by the hand. Scott-Blair and Coppen (Harper, 1952) investigated
the perception of the firmness-softness of industrial substances
(rubber, bitumen) by having the observer squeeze a cylindrical
sample of the material to be graded. The “feel” of the material was
quite clear at the end of this dynamic action. They concluded that
the perception “had the nature of a Gestalt,” but I would suggest
instead that an invariant was isolated. (p. 128)
Gibson (1966) further suggested that the invariant involved
in the perception of softness relates to the ratio of the force
exerted and the amount of depression of the surface (cf. Harper
and Stevens, 1964). In the case of dynamic touch, the relevant
invariants relate forces to movements. Let us now introduce the
physics of these invariants.
THE LAWS THAT GOVERN THE
ORGANISM-ENVIRONMENT
INTERACTION IN DYNAMIC TOUCH
Early research on dynamic touch analyzed the mechanical
properties that govern the perception of the length of hand-
held rods. In their pioneering study, Solomon and Turvey
(1988) reported a linear relation between actual and perceived
length and they argued that the observed pattern of results was
consistent with the claim that the length judgments were based
on the mechanical property that is referred to as first principal
moment of inertia (cf. Kreifeldt and Chuang, 1979). Although
this claim has been supported by later studies (e.g., Fitzpatrick
et al., 1994), it has also been questioned (e.g., Kingma et al.,
2004). Kingma et al. demonstrated the importance of a different
mechanical property, referred to as static moment (cf. van de
Langenberg et al., 2006). In the present section, we define such
mechanical properties and provide intuitions about how these
properties determine the relations between exerted forces and
resulting movements.
Consider a rod that is loosely attached to a support at one
of its ends so that the force of gravity orients the rod with its
longitudinal axis toward the ground. Measuring the force exerted
by the rod is one of the ways that allows the detection of the
mechanical property mass. To facilitate the presentation of less
well-known properties later in this section, it may be helpful to
note that the mass (M) of an object can approximated by:
M =
N∑
i=1
mi, (1)
in which the mis represent the point-masses of the object at N
different points (integral-form versions of this equation and of
Eqs 2 and 3 can be found in Jacobs et al., 2009). As captured
by Newton’s second law of motion (force = mass × acceleration),
mass can also be defined as the resistance of the object to linear
accelerations. This means that moving a rod in a direction that is
aligned with its longitudinal axis may reveal mass as the invariant
that relates force and acceleration.
The equation that defines mass does not include a term that
relates to the length of the object. This means that one cannot
differentiate rods with equal mass and different lengths with
linear movements along the longitudinal axis. Analogously, an
object can be attached to ropes of different lengths and if one
holds the rope vertically, one can detect mass, but not the length
of the rope. If, however, all the rods that one encounters are
of the same material and diameter (for instance in a laboratory
situation), then length and mass co-vary perfectly. This means
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that, for such a particular set of rods, exploratory movements that
allow the detection of mass also allow the detection of length.
Now consider a rod that is held by its end and maintained with
its longitudinal axis horizontal to the ground. The rotational force
that is exerted by the rod at the point of rotation corresponds
to the mechanical property called static moment. Extending
Equation 1, static moment (SM) can be defined as:
SM =
N∑
i=1
midi, (2)
in which each di is the distance of the corresponding point-
mass mi to the axis of rotation. For rods with the same
mass, homogeneously distributed over the length of the rod,
the static moment is higher for longer rods. Therefore, under
certain laboratory circumstances, statically maintaining a rod as
described above may allow one to differentiate the lengths of
objects with the same mass.
As a next step to introduce the mechanical properties and laws
that are most relevant to dynamic touch, we illustrate how rods
can be modified without changing their mass or static moment.
Consider Figure 1. The rods have the same mass. They also have
the same static moment, and thus exert the same rotational force
when held still horizontally. However, if one actively rotates the
rods, the lower one offers more resistance. This is so because
the resistance to rotation offered by mass is a squared function
of distance; hence, whereas moving M2 away from the axis of
rotation is compensated by moving M1 nearer for static moment,
this is not the case for the resistance against rotation. More
precisely, for one-dimensional rotations, the moment of inertia
(I) can be defined as:
I =
N∑
i=1
mid2i . (3)
In analogy to Newton’s second law for linear motion, the moment
of inertia determines the acceleration that is obtained with a
rotational force (i.e., τ = I × α), meaning that the moment
of inertia can be measured as the invariant relation between
rotational acceleration, α, and force, τ.
As a final step in our introduction to the relevant mechanical
properties and laws, one should note that, so far, we have only
considered one-dimensional rotations. Even if one considers a
single point of rotation, however, objects can be rotated around
FIGURE 1 | Two rods with equal mass and static moment but with different
principal moments of inertia.
different axes, leading to different amounts of resistance. A full
description of the 3-dimensional resistance to rotation that is
offered by an object is provided by the inertia tensor, which
is a symmetric 3 × 3 matrix with nine inertial components.
The inertia tensor, I, relates three-dimensional forces to three-
dimensional accelerations according to the formula: τ = I × α,
in which the use of boldface indicates the fact that the symbols
stand for vector and matrix properties. If one diagonalizes
the inertia tensor, the eigenvalues that one obtains are the
mechanical properties referred to as the first, second, and third
principal moments of inertia (I1 to I3). These moments can
also be described as the resistance against rotation around three
orthogonal axes that are ordered from the highest amount of
resistance to rotation to the lowest amount of resistance. For a
symmetric rod, I1 and I2 are identical and correspond to rotation
around axes that are orthogonal to the longitudinal axis of the
rod, and I3 corresponds to rotation around the longitudinal axis.
It is easy to intuitively experiment with some of these
mechanical properties and laws. To do so, we ask you to hold
a small rod between the thumb and index finger (for instance a
wooden ruler or any other elongated object). The rod will move
until aligned longitudinally with gravity. Move it up and down, so
that you can feel its mass. But, what about its length? Then, keep it
in a horizontal position. Does the effort change? What about mass
and length perception? Finally, grip the object from the center
and rotate it like a seesaw, and do the same while holding it by
the end (rotations with low and high I1, respectively). This small
experiment provides an intuitive demonstration that the relation
between self-produced forces and resulting accelerations allows
us to detect properties of wielded objects.
To summarize this section, during wielding, different types
of forces stand in different invariant relations to the resulting
accelerations. An enactivist may call these relations sensorimotor
laws. Being sensitive to these relations, or sensorimotor laws,
allows the perceiver to detect the mechanical properties that
underlie, or determine, the invariant relations. The starting
point of perceiving through dynamic touch, however, is not
formed by the mechanical properties that underlie the agent-
environment interactions. Instead, the starting point is formed by
the exploratory movements exerted by an intentional agent. The
next section, therefore, analyzes the exploratory movements and
the role of intention as modifier of these movements.
INTENTIONAL EXPLORATION:
BRINGING-FORTH THE WORLD
THROUGH DYNAMIC TOUCH
The concept of bringing-forth the world may be attributed
to Varela et al. (1991), who write: “Cognition in its most
encompassing sense consists in the enactment or a bringing
forth of a world [emphasis added] by a viable history of
structural coupling.” (p. 205). Elaborating on the concept, Proulx
(2008) states:
It is my structure that allows me to “see” or perceive things
in the physical world, and so my structure allows me to give
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meaning to the attributes of the physical world. I – my structure –
allow the physical world to be brought forth. If these attributes
of the physical world are outside of my structure, outside of
my capacity to make sense of them, I cannot distinguish them
and cannot perceive them. In other words, they cannot “trigger”
anything in me. Hence, I bring forth the physical world’s attributes
when I give/create meaning to it – I acknowledge their physical
“presence” by bringing them forth. If I do not bring them forth,
the physical world’s attributes will still be “there,” but they will
remain unnoticed, not made sense of and kept “in the dark.” It
is in this sense that the physical attributes themselves are brought
forth by my interaction with them (if I perceive them). In some
sense, I make the physical world emerge. (p. 21–22)
In our effort to stress commonalities between the enactivist
and ecological approaches, we should note the similarities
between the intentional exploration in dynamic touch and the
enactivist concept of bringing-forth the world. The mechanical
properties defined in the previous section (mass, static moment,
inertia tensor) are intrinsic properties that can be detected only
by acting upon them. Although the inertia tensor of an object
can physically be described independently of a perceiver, in order
to detect or measure the property, perceivers apply forces on the
object and identify relational aspects of the emerging interaction.
The fact that, in dynamic touch, the perceiver chooses which
mechanical properties to act upon, or bring forth, brings us
to the concept of intentionality. A common portrayal of the
ecological approach from enactive scholars considers that action
is reduced to mere movement, thus leaving intentionality out of
the explanations. For example, Di Paolo (2016) states:
In addition to a deep understanding of the environment, we need
a theory that pays attention to the perceiver as an active agent
and her capacity to engage her world meaningfully. “Active” here
does not mean simply “moving” (this is well-covered in ecological
psychology). It means engaged in a regulated coupling with
the environment, generating goals and pursuing them, moving
in ways that alter the constraints that link the agent and the
environment as coupled systems. (p. 327)
The example of dynamic touch, however, shows the central
role of actions and intentions in the ecological approach to
perception. In the ecological portrayal of dynamic touch, it is
particularly clear that exploratory movements are performed
because the perceiver intentionally, or purposefully, aims to reveal
certain mechanical properties of the object while ignoring others.
This notion of the role of action and intention in perception is
shared with enactivists researchers. A prominent example can be
found in the book Action in Perception (Noë, 2004):
Think of a blind person tip-tapping his or her way around a
cluttered space, perceiving that space by touch, not all at once,
but through time, by skillful probing and movement. This is, or at
least ought to be, our paradigm of what perceiving is. The world
makes itself available to the perceiver through physical movement
and interaction. (p. 1)
The concept of intentionality was, in fact, one of the key
concepts in the pioneering research on dynamic touch by
Solomon and Turvey (1988), and thereby one of the foundational
concepts for the body of research on dynamic touch. In
their words:
With a haptic subsystem, intentionality identifies the goal to be
attained. On the basis of the intention of the subject/performer,
the parts of the haptic perceptual system are assembled into
a special-purpose machine capable of attaining the desired
goal .... when the muscles and other tissues are assembled into
a subsystem, a functional unit, the behavior of the subsystem
is conjugate to the properties of the object under exploration.
(Solomon and Turvey, 1988, p. 405)
Later in this section we describe empirical research that
demonstrates how different intentions lead to different
exploratory movements. First, however, we describe empirical
research that indicates how different exploratory movements
determine the mechanical properties that are detected.
Burton and Turvey (1990) performed experiments on the
perception of length through dynamic touch with unrestricted
movements as well as with the instruction not to move the
rod. With instructional restrictions on the movements, static
moment predicted the length judgments better than the first
principal moment of inertia, whereas this was the other way
around for unrestricted movements. Relatedly, in their study on
length perception through dynamic touch, Lobo and Travieso
(2012) systematically restricted the exploratory movements in six
movement conditions with different amplitudes and frequencies.
With faster movements, more accurate judgments were obtained,
supporting the idea that, in unrestricted conditions, length
perception relies on the first principal moment of inertia.
Similar conclusions concerning the importance of exploratory
movements were obtained by Harrison et al. (2011). These
authors also showed that the intention to detect different
affordances (e.g., holdability, rotatability) affected length
perception. Their results “revealed perception to be constrained
by (a) the moments of mass distribution of the hand-tool system,
(b) the qualities of exploratory wielding movements, and (c)
the intention to perceive each specific property” (Harrison
et al., 2011, p. 193). A further example of how intentions affect
the detected mechanical properties as well as the exploratory
movements can be found in Arzamarski et al. (2010; cf. Riley
et al., 2002). These authors manipulated the intention of
participants by asking them to report either the length or the
width of hand-held objects. When participants intended to
perceive length, the exploratory movements showed relatively
more rotation around the anterior-posterior axis (as defined in
Figure 2), and the judgments were more closely related to I1
than to I3. On the contrary, when the intention was to perceive
width, participants performed relatively more rotations around
the twist axis and estimations were more closely related to I3
than to I1.
Rather than thinking about relatively simple exploratory
movements such as pure rotations or twists, one may prefer to
think about more complex ones. It is interesting to indicate in this
regard that Stephen et al. (2010) argue that fractal fluctuations
in exploration reveal the detection of information at many
time-scales:
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FIGURE 2 | Type of objects used in the experiments by Arzamarski et al.
(2010) with the relevant axes of rotation. Figure 8 from Arzamarski et al. (2010).
Indeed, even the miniscule musculoskeletal fluctuations incident
to static holding have been claimed to inform haptic judgments
(Burton and Turvey, 1990). Whereas static holding is simply
the maintenance of balance among muscular and gravitational
forces, wielding signifies a strongly intentional excursion from
balance that is meant to produce new or richer information about
the inertial properties of the object. Of course, active forces in
wielding movements will still interact with reactive forces: The
inertial properties of the object still exert effects on the trajectory
of the limb that are not explicitly prescribed by the muscle forces
exerted during wielding. (p. 2)
As an aside, the idea of multi-scale behavior is reminiscent
to an ecological theory of learning, referred to as direct learning
(Jacobs and Michaels, 2007), which holds that phenomena at
the time-scale of learning can be explained with the ecological
principles developed for the time-scale of perceiving and acting.
The above-mentioned study of Arzamarski et al. (2010) is related
to this theory, as well as other learning studies in the field
of dynamic touch (Michaels et al., 2008; Jacobs et al., 2009;
Withagen and van Wermeskerken, 2009). We refer the reader to
Higueras-Herbada et al. (2019) for a description of that theory
and its relevance to the dialogue between the enactive and
ecological approaches.
To summarize the gist of this section, the type of exploratory
movements that are performed determine which mechanical
properties become determinants of the agent-environment
interaction and which mechanical properties are irrelevant for
that interaction (e.g., twisting movements are affected by I3
but not by I1). The ecological portrayal of dynamic touch,
therefore, starts with the intention to perceive some property.
This intention leads to exploratory behavior that is determined
by, and hence reveals in the interaction, those mechanical
properties that relate to the property that the agent intends to
perceive. This portrayal is aligned with the writing of many
enactivists, who may say that the purposeful, autonomous agent
brings forth those mechanical properties that are relevant to her
goals, leaving in the dark other properties.
AFFORDANCES AND INVARIANTS IN
DYNAMIC TOUCH
Our next goal is to illustrate and hopefully clarify two
key concepts from the ecological approach: affordances and
invariants. Instead of providing canonical definitions of these
terms, we consider them using the example of dynamic touch.
With respect to affordances, we focus on the distinction between
perceiving and actualizing, which, we believe, is often under-
emphasized or misunderstood in the writings of scholars that
compare enactivism and ecological psychology.
When Gibson (1966) introduced the concept of invariant in
dynamic touch, he stated the following:
The mass of an object can be judged, in fact, by wielding it
in any of a variety of ways, such as tossing and catching, or
shaking it from side to side. One can only conclude that the
judgment is based on information, not on the sensations. The
stimulus information from wielding can only be an invariant of
the changing flux of stimulation in the muscles and tendons, an
exterospecific invariant in this play of forces. Whatever specifies
the mass of the object presumably can be isolated from the change,
and the wielding of the object has the function of separating
off the permanent component from the changes. The merely
propriospecific information can thus be filtered out, as it were,
leaving pure information about the object. This process takes time,
for an invariant can only emerge from a series of transformations
over time. (p. 127)
When we wield a tennis racket, for example, rotational hand
and arm forces lead to different movements. Those movements
depend on the original position of the hand-arm system and
the racket, and on the dynamics of the whole system in inertial
terms. The invariants that reside in the flux of change of forces
and movements are specific to intrinsic properties of the wielded
objects. However, in contrast to the interpretation of ecological
psychology as a physicalist approach, the information that is used
for perception through dynamic touch is not the specification
of such mechanical properties in discrete stimuli that are
internalized, or values that perceivers infer from stimulation
that is imposed on them. Quite the opposite, the invariants
exist because of the laws that govern the organism-environment
system only when these laws are combined with the intentional
exploration that creates the necessary change for the invariants
to come into existence. Perceiving, then, is the detection of the
invariants in the organism-environment interaction that specify
possibilities of action. As ecological psychologists would say: we
detect invariants and we perceive affordances.
As Carello and Turvey (2017) remind us, Gibson (1966) first
introduced the ideas behind the concept of affordance in his
reflections on dynamic touch:
Although he did not develop his notion of affordance until his
1979/1986 book it is, in fact, mentioned in Gibson (1966) in one of
the chapters on the haptic system. In arguing against the tradition
of imposing discrete stimuli on passive participants who were to
report “awareness of the impression, not the object making it” (p.
98), he recommended that an active observer obtaining patterns
of stimulation should be “allowed to report what he perceives,
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including what it affords or might be used for” (p. 99). (Carello
and Turvey, 2017, p. 97)
For rods, examples of affordances may be throwability,
holdability, rotatability, whether other objects can be reached
with the rods, or whether the rods are suitable for certain
hitting actions. In contrast to other properties (e.g., the length
or shape of rods), affordances are defined with respect to the
organism’s purposeful actions. This means taking the organism-
environment system as the unit of explanation. Thus, when
wielding an object and producing rotations, perceivers detect
the relation between exerted forces and resulting movements,
perceiving affordances that allow them to prospectively control
further movements (e.g., Bongers et al., 2004).
We believe that it is crucial for the dialogue between
enactivism and ecological psychology to clarify that perceiving
an affordance is not the same as actualizing an affordance
(i.e., performing the action that is afforded; Michaels et al.,
2001). For instance, perceiving that a stone affords throwing
(Bingham et al., 1989) is not the same as throwing the stone,
or perceiving that a ball can be caught is not the same as
actually catching the ball (Jacobs and Michaels, 2006). Consider a
further example. During the night, a person wakes up and wants
to go to the bathroom without turning the lights on. Instead,
she uses the light of her phone to illuminate her peripersonal
space (the space immediately close to her). With this light, she
sees one slipper under the bed, but, unfortunately, a bit far, so
she cannot reach it with her arm. She stares at the slipper as
she taps nearby objects in an attempt to find something that
allows her to reach the slipper. She grabs an object and wields
it, but rapidly discards it, as it is too short. Then she grabs
another object, does the same quick wielding, and finally uses
it, knowing that it will be long enough to reach the slipper.
Using the ecological vocabulary, one may say that the sequence
of actions started with the intention to get the missing slipper.
Using dynamic touch, in the first try with an object she did
not perceive the affordance of reaching the slipper. In the
second try, she did perceive the affordance. After perceiving the
affordance, she actualized the affordance by actually reaching
toward the slipper.
When actualizing an affordance, then, such as throwing a
stone, catching a ball, or reaching for a slipper, information is
used that allows the actor to control the relevant forces. The
action itself emerges from the information-action couplings and
the dynamics of the agent-environment system. This means
that, for the actualization of affordances, one does not need
environmental information that specifies the affordance. Hence,
in line with what is often claimed by enactivists (e.g., Varela et al.,
1991), for a theory of perceptually-guided action (i.e., a theory
about actualizing affordances), one does not need environmental
information that specifies affordances.
In order to veridically perceive an affordance, however,
often done before actualizing the affordance, a relation of
specificity must be maintained between the agent and the
environment (Jacobs and Michaels, 2002). In the case of dynamic
touch, this implies a lawful chain of specificity that goes
from the intention to perceive the affordance, to invariants
in the flux of forces and movements that is created during
the exploration, via the mechanical properties of the wielded
object, to the actual affordance, as well as vice versa. If
an affordance is not specified in detectable information, it
cannot be perceived. Ecological psychologists are interested in
the perception of affordances, for which the specification of
affordances is indispensable, as well as in the actualization of
affordances, which may be analyzed with less concern about what
is specified by the information that guides the movement (cf.
Michaels et al., 2001).
Varela et al. (1991), in their treatment of the ecological
approach, had in mind the actualization of affordances when
they describe their own position. This is clear, for example, when
they write: “The overall concern of an enactive approach to
perception is ... to determine the common principles or lawful
linkages between sensory and motor systems that explain how
action can be perceptually guided” (p. 173). In this regard,
the enactive approach is more closely related to the part of
the ecological approach about the actualization of affordances
than to the part about the perception of affordances. Rather
than noting existing commonalities with ecological research
about the actualization of affordances, however, Varela et al.
(1991) distanciate themselves from the ecological approach
by referring to ecological ideas concerning the perception of
affordances: “In Gibson’s view ... perceptually guided action
consists in ‘picking up’ or ‘attending to’ invariances in the
ambient light that directly specify their environmental source” (p.
203). This quote seems to concern the actualization of affordances
(“perceptually guided action”) in its first part but changes its
emphasis toward the perception of affordances (“invariants that
specify their source”) in the latter part. To summarize, rather
than searching for commonalities with theoretical and empirical
research from the ecological tradition about the actualization of
affordances, enactivist scholars often choose to stress differences
by focusing on parts of the ecological approach that concern the
perception of affordances – an issue that, one way or another, any
approach has to address.
Apart from the confusion concerning perception and
actualization, the concept of affordance is often claimed to be
well suited to the enactivist approach (Varela et al., 1991) and is
mentioned ubiquitously by enactivists (e.g., Noë, 2004; Di Paolo
et al., 2017; Gallagher, 2017). This is so because affordances are
related to the bringing-forth the world concept of enactivism and
to sense-making. We briefly address the concept of sense-making
before our concluding section.
SENSE-MAKING AGENCY IN DYNAMIC
TOUCH
Sense-making agency refers to a conception of agency by
which the organism builds up its agency through meaningful
interactions with the environment. In this context, perception
is not a blind contact with the environment that imprints
its effect on the sensory surfaces, which is afterward
processed searching for regularities. Using the words of
Thompson and Stapleton (2009):
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Even the simplest organisms regulate their interactions with the
world in such a way that they transform the world into a place
of salience, meaning, and value – into an environment (Umwelt)
in the proper biological sense of the term. This transformation of
the world into an environment happens through the organism’s
sense-making activity. (p. 25)
The concept of sense-making refers to the particular behavior
of the autonomous organism that is determined by its structure
(for example, only animals with eyes can see), which makes
available certain properties of the physical world that constitute
the environment for her. Moreover, enactivists remain skeptical
of those animal-environment relations in which specification
does not imply an intentional action on the part of the organism.
A clear example is the detection of time-to-contact (Lee, 1976).
Despite the fact that the original analysis concerned the active
control of movement by the perceiver (i.e., the control of
braking by a driver), the optical specification of time-to-contact
can be demonstrated for the case where the perceiver actively
approaches a static object as well as for the case where an object
approaches a static perceiver. Thus, Di Paolo (2016) states that
for enactivists:
Meaning is not just something that pops up in the relation
between organism and environment. It necessitates a particular
kind of activity on the part of the agent to emerge, i.e., sense-
making. (p. 328)
In the paradigmatic case of dynamic touch, the history of
interaction with the object consists of the exploratory wielding,
where forces exerted by the agent produce changes in the position
of the objects. The objects that are wielded during dynamic
touch, and the mechanical properties that we described earlier in
this article, therefore form part of the meaningful environment
of the perceiving agent. An enactivist may claim that dynamic
touch is the sense-making activity that makes that the rods and
the relevant mechanical properties form part of the meaningful
environment of the agent. The ecological example of dynamic
touch, therefore, as well as the concept of affordance, can
easily be related to enactivist concerns about sense-making. For
further debate about the notion of sense-making we refer the
reader to Fultot et al. (2016).
From our perspective, at the same time that the sense-making
activity determines the ecological niche for the organism –
only animals with eyes can see – the environment exerts
selective pressure on the organisms, establishing constraints
on the structure of the organism – eyes are adaptive only
in an environment with light that obeys the laws of optics.
Therefore, we can consider that the sense-making activity is
determined by the structure of the organism, and the laws
governing the sensorimotor activity are those describing the
physical world in which they are embedded. The strength of
the dynamic touch example is that, together with the sense-
making activity, we have a detailed description of the laws
governing the physical interaction. Borrowing, again, the words
of Di Paolo (2016):
Despite the accent on agency as always situated in an
environment, it is correct that there is a dearth of enactive
theorizing about the environment, as noted by McGann (2014).
Does this mean that such theorizing is unwanted or that it could
not fit well with other enactive ideas? I do not think so. It is more a
case that it has not been done yet, and what better encouragement
to do this than to engage in ongoing dialogues with ecological
psychologists. (p. 329)
CONCLUSION
In this article we have aimed to reveal commonalities
rather than emphasizing differences between enactivism
and ecological psychology, using dynamic touch as example.
We have argued that more similarities can be identified
than is often indicated in the literature. In this sense, we
have shown how dynamic touch can provide an excellent
test bed for enactivist ideas concerning sensorimotor laws,
bringing forth the world, goal-directed agency, and sense-
making activity. In particular, the active and intentional
information detection put forward by ecological psychologists
implies that ecological information is not instructive,
meaning that the information does not determine what is
perceived or acted upon.
Given that not all perceptual tasks reveal such an obvious
intentional exploration as dynamic touch, however, one may
wonder whether dynamic touch can be considered a generalizable
example. That is, would the enactivist and ecological approaches
show as much similarity if analyzed with another example?
In this regard, it is interesting to note that both enactivists
and ecological psychologists tend to indicate similarities
between vision and touch. To illustrate this for ecological
psychology, consider two quotes from Gibson’s (1962) seminal
article on active touch. Concerning passive touch and vision,
he states:
In passive touch the individual makes no voluntary movements.
Similarly, in passive vision he makes no eye movements, which
means that he must voluntarily fixate his eyes on a point specified
by the experimenter. Neither state is natural to an individual.
(Gibson, 1962, p. 489)
Concerning active touch and vision, in contrast, he states:
The foregoing survey suggests that vision and touch have nothing
in common only when they are conceived as channels for
pure and meaningless sensory data. When they are conceived
instead as channels for information-pickup, having active
and exploratory sense organs, they have much in common.
(Gibson, 1962, p. 490)
To illustrate that similarities between vision and touch are
also indicated in the work of enactive scholars, reflecting a
notion of perception in which the enactive and ecological
approaches can meet, we conclude with a quote from a
prominent predecessor of the enactive approach, Maurice
Merleau-Ponty: “Vision is a palpation with the look” (cited in
Noë, 2004, p. 35).
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